Rather than assume full recovery by 1879 as does Temin, we have explicitly estimated the impact on hypothetical southern consumption of the supposed slowdown in world demand for cotton. Our calculation does not indicate that we have greatly inflated the costs attributable to factors associated with the Civil War, but reasserts our initial conclusion that such costs were very large.
The value of southern cotton production in 1859 was $197.6 million or $23.15 per capita, and it grew from 1839 to 1859, at a per capita rate of 3.56 percent per year.6 Had that growth rate continued after 1859, the value of cotton output in 1879 would have been $46.64 per capita or $596.9 million for the entire South. Gavin Wright's research indicates, however, that the actual level of demand did not increase at its prewar rate and was only 46 percent of what would have been achieved in 1879 had demand continued to increase at that rate. In per capita terms demand in 1879 was only 49 percent of its hypothetical level.7 Our estimate of the loss in consumption from this retardation in cotton demand is computed by comparing the actual demand for cotton to a hypothetical demand, one growing at the prewar rate, and computing the difference in income between these two cases for 1879.
The market for cotton in 1879 is depicted in Figure 1 , where Dh is the hypothetical cotton demand curve assuming the (per capita) prewar demand shift continued; Da is the actual cotton demand curve, assuming Wright's data are correct; and S is the cotton supply curve. The shaded area, P0P1BA, represents the impact on hypothetical income in the South of the reduction in the rate of increase in cotton demand. If the supply and demand curves Our estimates of AY given in Table 1 are based on Wright's calculation of the prewar elasticity of cotton demand (1.099) and are computed for three values of y. We can now recompute the "indirect cost of the Civil War," that is, the value of foregone consumption discounted to 1860 from the Civil War and related events, using Temin's assumption that the prewar demand for cotton grew at Wright's estimated post-war rate. All that is required is a hypothetical per capita consumption stream, and to compute this we have assumed that the 1860 to 1879 rate of growth implied by the figures in Table  1 would have continued to 1899. The post-1899 growth rate is assumed to be equal to the pre-Civil War rate. The results of this computation are given in Table 2 . Contrary to Temin's conclusion, Wright's findings on cotton demand do not substantially alter our calculations. We did not magnify the economic cost attributable to the Civil War by four times. Even the extreme case of y=O does not reverse the main qualitative findings of our paper. The more reasonable values of y = 1 and y = 3.5 generate essentially the same results. Furthermore, these revised estimates of the cost of the war are almost certainly biased downward for the following three reasons.
1. We have assumed that the entire reduction in the rate of growth in cotton demand (including the domestic demand) was completely independent of the war.
2. We have not included the increase in consumers' surplus to southern cotton consumers, resulting from the lower cotton price. These two biases are probably quite small, but a third may not be.
3. We have assumed that had the value of cotton production per capita continued to grow at its prewar rate, 3.56 percent per year, then per capita consumption in the South would have grown at its prewar rate, 1.30 percent per year. Between 1839 and 1859 cotton's income share increased from 17 percent to about 27 percent. Therefore had per capita cotton output increased after the war at its prewar rate, the growth of per capita southern income would almost certainly have accelerated.9 We can now divide our measure of the "indirect cost of the Civil War" into four main components: the direct cost of the war including physical and human capital destruction, the cost due to a reduction in the labor supply of freedmen, that is due to emancipation, the cost due to the decline in the rate of growth in demand for cotton, and a residual.'0 Our allocation of these 9 For example, if we assume that both the value of cotton and non-cotton outputs had each continued to grow at their per capita prewar rates, then per capita consumption would have increased at 1.62 percent per year, not at 1.30 percent per year as we have assumed in our paper. Per capita consumption in 1879 would then have been $117.40. Reducing this figure by the effect of the slowdown in cotton demand from Wright's data gives the following results: yO y 1 y 3. 
